Challenge the accepted
January 4th, 2018 by MAJGEN F.A. McLachlan
Keynote Address delivered on 26 October 2017 by Major General Fergus McLachlan AM, Forces Commander – Australian Army, to the Northern Australian Defence Summit, Darwin Convention Centre, written in collaboration with Colonel Ian Langford DSC and Bar, Director Future Plans Headquarters Forces Command.
Ladies and gentlemen.
I would like to acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of the land on which we are meeting this morning, the Larrakia people, and pay my respects to their elders, both past and present. I would also like to pay my respects to the indigenous Australians who have given their lives Defending Australia, many doing so before they were even recognised as citizens.
Thank you to the leadership and staff of this year’s Northern Australian Defence Summit. The north of Australia is important to all Defence planners and I am honoured to speak at a forum that includes former President Yudhoyono of Indonesia. I also welcome the significant Defence industry presence. As Land Forces Commander I am the officer charged with generating about 85% of the Army, including the Darwin based 1st Brigade. I am not a policy maker, and I am no longer responsible for the Army relationship with industry but I hope that my presentation today gives you context about our planning and training challenges. My presentation will seek to impart two important points: How Army force generation and design meets our policy directions under the Defence White Paper, and how we in the Army intend to fight and win in future War. In doing so I anticipate you will gain an understanding of the challenges faced by those you seek to work with.
In an era when it feels like we are living in an age of perpetual conflict, or as what the New York Times journalist Dexter Filkins has described as a ‘Forever War’ the ability of all of Australia’s elements of national power to better integrate our efforts and improve our interdepartmental cooperation has never been more important. As a Defence Leader outside Canberra I now enjoy being a bit removed from the bureaucratic process and instead focused on the force generation end of the capability life cycle.
Defence leaders are energised by the dynamism of the security environment and the challenge of generating forces agile enough to respond to rapidly changing circumstances. The third and fourth decade of the 21st century promise a future whose shape is uncertain, and whose security and prosperity are challenged by dangers both seen and unseen. We must constantly endeavour to broaden our understanding of those dangers, and develop concepts and strategies to meet them, if we are to build on our successes today and position ourselves for ongoing success tomorrow. The first years of the 21st century have demonstrated that dangers can take many forms. Some dangers are traditional, and relate to state-on-state tensions over territory, resources or the balance and distribution of power. The power dynamic happening right now on the Korean Peninsula is testament to this. Some are old challenges in new guises, such as the emergence of new terrorist and counter-state groups like Islamic state who have been fighting the Philippines government in south-east Asia. Some challenges are entirely new, such as climate change, the emergence of the cyber domain and the potential impacts of global demography changes.
The ADF of today does not operate in a single environment; instead, we are deployed from urban to jungle, from deserts to mountains. We operate in the midst of populations, in the airspace above them and far out at sea. We operate in an already contested cyber domain and we are increasingly attuned to the risk of conflict in space. This will continue to be the case well into the future. At a time of digital disruption when it is not clear what future industries will look like, the business model of Armed forces sadly remains strong. The threat or use of force will continue to be a feature in international affairs for the foreseeable future, and we cannot guarantee that Australia will remain free from credible threats to our people or interests. While the international system can act to constrain the use of force, it has proven incapable of eliminating conflict between and within states, or from non-state actors.
The Australian Approach to Warfare stresses that:
…our warfare concepts reflect Australia’s particular geographic environment, military and economic resource constraints, the opportunities offered by technological change and innovation, and the professionalism and fighting spirit of our defence force. Australia’s limited resources put a premium on professional skill, delegation and initiative, and a robust command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system so as to make decisions better and more quickly than an adversary.
This statement, taken from the ADF’s future joint operating concept, is significant for Army’s land combatants, in that it articulates our design philosophy while providing a capstone reference for the important components of how we fight on land; we therefore emphasise the importance of being as well trained in tactics and operations as our resources allow, and we continue to place pre-eminence on the importance of decentralised decision making as means of generating superior tempo against an enemy who is potentially either larger in size than our own force elements, or increasingly small, agile and flexible. Preparing our land forces as a part of a joint force, is one of the key challenges for today. Such is the changing character of war, our challenge is to prepare a force that is able to dominate and win across the peace-conflict-war spectrum without becoming obsolete due to the rate of change of technology. Adaption will be critical to the ADF being able to maintain its regional primacy as a military force. When we contemplate just how contested and lethal the future operating environment is likely to be in the next two years, let alone in 10 or 15, we realise that these terms are not abstract; they are the difference between surviving or dying in future war.
As a senior leader in the Army I am one of those responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force to realize the plans and deliver on the investments made by Government to build the Australian Defence Force of the future. Delivering a Defence White Paper that was fully-costed and that aligns strategy, capability and resources was a significant task for Defence and Government. Indeed, much of the success of the White Paper is due to the rigorous and methodical process conducted over two years to outline Australia’s strategic environment and develop a force structure capable of responding to current and future challenges. I take pride in my involvement in that process as both head of joint capability for a time and then lead for Army modernisation.
But for Forces Command, the release of the White Paper is not the end of the process; it is in fact the beginning. The challenge of all policies, including the White Paper, is to turn the words into a reality.
I want to acknowledge that there are other lines of effort in Defence that support our role in force generation. Since the release of the White Paper, you would also be aware that the Defence Department has also embarked on a significant reform programme known as the First Principles Review. Amongst many other objectives, the Review seeks to realise the ADF as a truly joint force. It emphasises better integration; not just amongst the services, but also across the department and government more broadly, to also include Australian Defence Industry partners. Creating a true partnership with industry that provides us with a functioning “Land Combat System” that connects our people and systems, free from proprietary barriers, is an essential component of realizing the DWP16 vision and I welcome the new clarity and the collegiate behaviour that has emerged from this reform.
Our Army is moving to become a Medium-Weight force; a credible tactical force that projects across strategic distances to achieve national objectives. These capabilities exist as part of a joint, close-combat ‘eco-system’ we call the combined arms team. I confess to being disappointed about the extent to which our Army requires to justify to armchair strategists the ongoing need for all elements of the combined arms team. It was General Sir John Monash who said “The true role of infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort, not to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, not to impale itself on hostile bayonets, but on the contrary, to advance under the maximum possible protection of the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine-guns, tanks, mortars and aeroplanes; to advance with as little impediment as possible.” This wisdom from Monash needs little adjustment to keep it contemporary. Now these systems exist as part of a ‘digital, protected and mobile’ suite of platforms and effects that provide the building blocks of Army’s digital land capability. One example of a component of the combined arms team we continue to have to justify is the M1A1 Main Battle Tank. If you had been able to join us on the recent Exercise Talisman Sabre – or followed our extensive coverage on social media – you would have seen a joint force cooperating to train in a demanding regional scenario in which we conducted an amphibious landing of all elements of our combined arms team, including the tank, before conducting joint manoeuvre to defeat an adaptive, hybrid enemy. We manoeuvred land forces to force the defending enemy to adjust their positions. At the point our enemy came out of concealment and came above the detection threshold we destroyed them with our joint fires system. We are still analysing the results but I would anticipate that some 60% of the destruction of our exercise adversary was achieved by long range precision fires from the air, sea and land.
However contemporary operations in Iraq continue to show that a cunning enemy can and will often maintain discipline and stay concealed. They get to decide when and where the fight starts. When that happens I want a tank nearby. The tank enables manoeuvre. But as the British learned in the mud of the Western Front, and as the Iraqi Army learned on the outskirts of Mosul, the tank restores manoeuvre to the battlefield only when coupled with all arms—including fires and aviation- making it an elemental component alongside our infantry close combatants and our enabling cyber, electronic warfare and logistics systems that form part of the digital land combat system. Army force generation continues to be focussed on this agile adaptable core combat capability that can be scaled or applied to the complete threat continuum.
The process of generating and sustaining these forces is ‘capability management’ and requires the balancing of current force requirements (preparedness) with future force development (modernisation) to produce strategically relevant and combat-ready forces. Army is now in the process of a major equipment re-capitalisation which must deliver more than just replacement platforms, rather it must deliver equipment that can be part of a deeply integrated system of networked capability which is linked not only across our other services, but also reverse engineered to include our legacy systems. It must be capable of linking with the members of the FVEY community but also interface with other partners when the mission demands.
Creating an internet of things that links your fridge to your grocery order is simply a luxury. Creating a secure network of defence capabilities is not. For example our small Defence Force needs to exist in a future in which the soon to be acquired Army air and missile defence system can interface with the Wedgetail AEW&C, the joint strike fighter of the Air Force and the Naval Air Warfare Destroyers because the speed of an incoming missile or aircraft will not allow time for swivel chair integration in which a human moves data between disparate systems. We will need machine to machine communications with very low latency, preferably with algorithms that help assign the most suitable fire unit. While this will be a big step forward for an Army only recently emerging from 3rd generation analogue command and control, it must be done if we are to maintain an edge over technical advances in our region. And it is important to note that this work will be concurrent to us meeting the challenges of mounting, deploying and sustaining forces to current known operations (in the last 12 months the Darwin based 1st Brigade deployed more than 1300 personnel to global operations), while also maintaining forces on a directed readiness notice for unexpected contingencies. These measures are necessary to meet the reality of a world that is a dynamic and changing eco-system which could require us to use military force in order to protect our national interests, wherever those interests lie. So how do we prepare your Army and what do we prepare it for?
Australia’s strategic environment is expected to be more uncertain in coming decades as a consequence of our physical and political geography: Influences like the relationship between the US and China; challenges to the stability of a rules-based global order; terrorism and violent extremism emanating from ungoverned spaces; state fragility; the pace of military modernisation; and the emergence of new complex technological and non-geographic threats, including cyber. This threat spectrum seems to be broadening and more difficult to define. How then do we design, build and train our Army to be able to respond to these threats?
Risk assessments balance likelihood and consequence. I think it is possible to assess which of these threats is more likely than the other. It is also possible to determine which of these is a more existential threat. I will return to this force design conundrum later in my speech.
Much of the continuing conflict in the Middle East is being fuelled by individual empowerment through innovations in technology, digitisation and connectivity. Some are calling the most recent manifestation of this threat the emergence of the Hacker / Maker. Over more than a decade, a lot of people have been killed in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Mahgreb in the fight against Al Qaida, the Taliban, Daesh, and other radical ideologies. Their ideology is rampant and resilient and they are cunning and adaptive. The hacker / maker can operate in the electromagnetic domain and they can craft weapons as diverse as flying drones that can release explosive payloads to armoured bulldozers. How to dismantle and defeat these actors is something that all progressive militaries and security forces are grappling with. It is clear that a more can and must be done. An integrated effort amongst our own joint forces, across our allies and government agencies will be absolutely critical in ensuring our efforts are unified and our capacity for innovation is fully enabled. Our narrative, which is the right one, must remain central, clear and articulate. We must be able to provide a meaningful counterpoint to the appeal of the ‘gangster jihadist’ emanating from the likes of Islamic State.
At the other end of the scale is the assertive nation state, acting in an increasingly discomforting fashion. We see today in places including East-Asia, the Middle-East and Eastern Europe an interplay between states which appears to defy contemporary norms. Or is it perhaps returning to previously established norms? Russia’s assertive tone in Europe is just one example of such challenges to the status quo. Our region is not exempt from this phenomenon. These challenges seek to drive change in calculated ways designed to avoid over provocation and self-defeating responses: it is classic brinkmanship. And the ‘Thuycidides Trap’ remains an interesting perspective on potentially what happens in international relations if controls, conventions, and agreements are ignored or de-legitimised.
The default answer to the challenges of the dynamic nature of the international systems is of course ‘statecraft’ – defined as “the skillful management of state affairs”. In our system, our agencies and departments are the practical enablers of statecraft, through both policy development and transactional engagement. DFAT, and the other key components of our whole-of-government national security apparatus, are vital to providing the supporting mechanisms of Australian contemporary statecraft.
However DFAT has finite capacity. As an aside, I learned during my secondment to the staff of the US Secretary for Defense during the drafting of the 1st Obama Quadrennial Defense Review that at the time, there were more bandsmen in the US Navy, Army, Marines and Air Forces than there were Foreign Service officials in the US Department of State! While I am confident that is not the case in Australia, it is true that our diplomats need assistance in a region in which many ruling elites contain senior military officers and where coordinated engagement by our three Services can extend the reach and effectiveness of our statecraft.
“Military diplomacy” has a deep tradition in the services. Organisational and individual engagement with regional partners has created deep and enduring bonds with the militaries of Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. However, my good friend John Blaxland has correctly identified that due to the long period of war in the Middle East many ADF leaders, me included, have stronger relationships with US, UK and NATO leaders than with our regional peers. Chapter Five of the Defence White Paper 2016 directs a specific reinvestment in military diplomacy, most notably within our near region. It outlines a substantial plan that brings international engagement from the tail of Defence resource allocation to the front, leveraging off of the wide range of attaches and support staff already established at posts throughout the region, and around the world.
White Paper direction will see growth in our representation in some Indo-Pacific states, with enhancement of our representation in many others. Recently the Chief of the Army directed a greater focus on the manner in which we train, develop and manage language and cultural competencies among Army’s people. As a land combat system that operates inside and outside of periods of declared conflict, we must become more regionally astute and culturally mindful of the region in which we live.
Another important aspect of Defence’s international engagement and posture is the evolution of the Defence Cooperation Program to leverage new capabilities as they come online. The most significant example of this is the acquisition and realisation of the operational capability of amphibious ships, HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide. These are the most significant advancement to ADF capability in my 35 year career. They provide an extraordinary opportunity for regional engagement by ADF and our international partners. The real success of this was tangibly demonstrated during the whole of government post-cyclone disaster relief operations in Vanuatu and Fiji throughout 2016 during which a large demonstration of Australian capability and intent appeared in the storm ravaged harbours of our region and started delivering meaningful emergency relief and reconstruction support.
Our land forces actively engage with a significant number of countries as part of a wider Defence International Engagement Strategy. The Defence, and subordinate Army IE strategy is designed to posture the ADF to shape the environment and respond to contingencies rapidly and effectively. Knowledge and familiarity with the region, combined with an understanding of and connection to its people, contribute to the achievement of Defence’s missions.
Our engagement strategy seeks to enhance our ability to know and shape our primary operating environment in circumstances short of conflict. The employment of soft power can provide numerous benefits including: influencing regional militaries in order to avoid conflict; assisting development of a partner’s resilience to domestic instability and capacity to operate in coalition with us; and enhancing Army’s capability to respond to instability.
In coming years Army seeks to invest additional resources to enhance its relationships with partners as diverse as Japan, China, Fiji and India, while also seeking to further strengthen more established Army to Army relationships with regional neighbours such as PNG, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Singapore and Malaysia in accordance with Defence White Paper direction. In a number of cases minor growth represents a significant investment in the relationship, and could have a significant impact on our influence. Our land forces will maintain the strength of our relationship with the US, and the Five Eyes community (plus the French), which remains fundamental to Australia’s security interests. Beyond the US Army and US Marine Corps, our relationships with the armies of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada and France remain very important as reference points to benchmark and guide our posture and capability.
I now want to turn to our people and how we prepare them for the future. Our land force now sits at a point of reflection following seventeen years of operations in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat is changing and our land combat system must change with it. Militaries who prepare for all threats risk being ready for none. We often face the dilemma of force-structuring ourselves against the ‘most-dangerous’ type of threat, yet it seems the ‘most-likely’ scenario is somewhat different. An example would be the conflict between the need to prepare larger forces for medium-intensity conflict as part of a combined force against a nation-state, as opposed to the more likely situation which could include leading a regional stability operation as we did in East Timor 1999, or a contribution to an operation to defeat a violent extremist with power projection aspirations. In recent years we have been able to conduct such operations far from Australia but our region is not immune. We are likely to see similar threats emerge in SE Asia as IS morph into discrete, decentralized cells, a recent example being Marawi in the southern Philippines.
Dealing with this is a challenge. What we do know from experience is that we must equip and train for the most demanding of the threats we face. As David Morrison reminded us when he was Chief of Army it would be a foolish Army that bench-marked capability against the Taliban. It is far more important to be adaptable enough to respond, in reasonable time and at reasonable cost, to existential threats to our national interest. We can always adapt down to agile, demanding but otherwise less threatening challenges to our national interests. This is the same challenge faced by my peers in the Fleet and in Air Command. For example it is far more demanding training a P8 crew to hunt for submarines in a multi-dimensional threat environment than it is to prepare for an overland ISR mission against a primitive insurgency. This adaptability of the three services allows a nation’s fighting power to be relevant across the spectrum of war.
In Forces Command we develop five factors to ensure the Australian Army’s adaptability.
The first two are training and education. Having better trained and educated people capable of decentralised decision making remains the single biggest advantage the ADF retains over potential adversaries. Training provides a suite of individual and collective military skills, from a soldier who can shoot accurately under the pressure of battle to Commanders and staff capable of orchestrating Divisional manoeuvre. The conduct of training is deep in the fibre of the Australian Army; it is one of the seven elements of ‘culture’ described in Army’s capstone philosophical doctrine.
However, training alone is insufficient. It is the theory of war that provides the intellectual, conceptual and ethical foundations to practically apply these skills; to successfully adapt them to a given theatre in a given character of war. While definitions of ‘educate’ are myriad, the Australian Army is drawn to one of the oldest from the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘to give intellectual, moral and social instruction’. This speaks to the heart of what military education seeks to achieve.
The third factor is doctrine. How a force fights, organises and marshals resources is elemental for force generation. Rules, in the form of doctrine are the means in which this is achieved. Doctrine is both formal and informal, and speaks to the culture of a force.
The fourth is equipment. For modern tactics to be even feasible certain core capabilities (such as effective armour for close combat, digital systems for battlefield communications, and intelligence equipment in support of a targeting cycle) must be developed, and procurement cycles must be rapid enough to obtain ‘fit-for-purpose’ items in a timely fashion.
The final factor is experience. Experience provides the shortcuts by which military professionals rapidly adapt and apply trained skills, allowing the practical application of learned theory and achievement of professional proficiency. It is experience that builds resilience against the inherent fog, fear, friction and stress of war. Experience is priceless and must be developed like any other commodity. When time and experience are unavailable, education, discourse, practice and imitation provides an alternative. We aim to create pre-combat veterans for whom there is little shock or surprise when they confront the violence and chaos of modern conflict.
It will not be lost on you that four of these five factors relate to our people and only one relates to equipment. This can lead to truisms like “Army equips the man while the other services man the equipment” or “it is not equipment that matters, it is the quality of our people”. These are dangerous. I am the person charged with generating your Army and I can tell you that in many areas, our people are better than the equipment we provide them.We demand the best equipment our nation can afford, just like our 5th generation Air Force and recapitalised Navy.
Let me now look to the future. I cannot envisage any contemporary or future scenario where ‘land’ capability will operate in isolation from the joint force. And this is especially true when considering the issue of air-land-sea integration. We need to continue to improve the means and rapidity with which a situation is understood, decisions are made, resources assigned, tactical effects delivered, and outcomes promulgated to commanders, capitals and communities. Recent decades have shown that a key change in the character of war is the speed of transmission of ideas (that is, information / data). This requires us to be more agile in our understanding of the battlespace and also in our ability to execute. Once again, suggesting the importance of integration.
Conceptually this is elegantly simple. Of course, in practice it quickly becomes difficult as multiple actors and capabilities combine with environmental effects and the friction ever present in the battlespace. Clausewitz and many others have been telling us this for hundreds of years but I doubt even the dead Prussian could have envisioned the myriad different tactical data links, messaging protocols or network architecture options faced by modern force designers!
An effective Multi-Domain capability which networks, fuses, and optimises all joint forces, including the land combat system, is an insight into future conflict. All ‘all-force’ Integrated Air and Missile Defence System detects, tracks, identifies and monitors airborne objects – including aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles and other surface to surface weapons. It will use algorithms and machine learning to prioritise targets and identify the most appropriate fire unit and – if necessary – engage them using surface-based (land or sea) or airborne weapons systems. An Integrated Air and Missile Defence (or ‘IAMD’) is a key enabler for joint force operations and encourages a system of ‘cooperative engagement’, which emphasises a fully integrated and efficient targeting network that designs kinetic and non-kinetic solutions in an ‘all-informed’ networked environment.
A theatre-level IAMD is capable of providing a detailed single integrated common operating picture of aircraft and missile threats that is able to be shared amongst the friendly network, giving all ships, aircraft, and land systems the ability to create an integrated air defence network and share sensor data in real time.
You may be wondering why a senior Army officer is so engaged about IAMD. In October last year in Washington I participated in a panel discussion with the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, the Commanding General of US Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Deputy Secretary of the US DoD Mr Bob Work. Most surprising, given that I was speaking at a US Army sponsored event was that we were joined by ADM Harry Harris, Commander US Pacific Command. ADM Harris set the tone when he said: “We need a degree of joint-ness, in my opinion, in which no one military service dominates and no domain has a fixed boundary. A combatant commander must be able to create effects from any single domain to target in every domain in order to fight tonight and win.” He went on to say “I’d like to see the Army’s land forces sink a ship, shoot down a missile, and shoot down the aircraft that fired that missile – near simultaneously – in a complex environment where our joint and combined forces are operating in each other’s domains.”
You will be pleased to know that Defence White Paper 16 anticipated this requirement. The Integrated Investment Plan includes the thoroughly modern and interoperable air defence capability for the Army I described earlier. It also includes long range surface to surface fires and a land based anti-ship missile capability. These later systems are proposed for the outer years of the investment plan but they introduce capabilities that revolutionise the way Army operates so we must start preparing the intellectual and doctrinal framework for their use now.
These are not academic challenges in Forces Command. The advent of mass-produced, militarily cheap autonomous drones is already allowing ISIL to swarm armed drones over Iraqi forces. Soon simple AI programs will allow those swarms to act together in a coherent way to achieve military effect. Whether we like it or not we are in an ‘arms race’. This time it is not just a race between states. The arms race now includes non-state actors who can access lethal, precise weapon systems capable of overwhelming legacy unconnected or stove-pipe systems. The need for ‘adaptive refresh’ and the avoidance of ‘block’ or system obsolescence will be essential to ensure systems like IAMD remain capable and effective. Similarly the generation of enabled land forces in Forces Command must be more adaptive and agile than ever before.
We are ready to create the decision advantage offered by these emerging capabilities. But we must also seek to address the wider integration and management implications of increased data collection and flow.
Ladies and Gentlemen, to conclude today, I would like to quote US Air Force Colonel John Boyd, the man responsible for developing many of our modern decision cycles, most notably the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act cycle of ‘OODA’. I quote:
“Machines don’t fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. That’s where the battles are won.”
The core role of Army remains the ability to engage in combat, as part of a joint force, against other armed forces. This remains a challenging undertaking, amongst many other challenges in the military enterprise. Army, as a part of the integrated Joint Force is the only component of national power capable of close combat on land. In future conflict, strategic outcomes will continue to be achieved through land operations. The future land combat system must represent a credible, robust capability. We must continue to expand its operational adaptability to include tasks beyond declared conflict- it must be able to effectively deter, prevent, shape, influence without compromising our ability to conduct Joint Land Combat. A ‘war ready’ Army that can provide contributions inside and outside declared conflict is a critical component to protecting Australia’s national interests and will is vital in ensuring our ability to prevail in an era of persistent conflict.
 Filkins, Dexter, 2017 Contributors- Dexter Filkins, The New Yorker, accessed 02 July 2017, http://www.newyorker.com/contributors/dexter-filkins.
 Google, Dictionary, 2017, Definition of Statecraft, accessed 01 August 2017, https://www.google.com.au/search?q=definition+of+statecraft&sourceid=ie7&rls=com.microsoft:en-AU:IE-Address&ie=&oe=&safe=active&gfe_rd=cr&ei=pGNdWeHdK5Hp8weCtbTwAQ&gws_rd=ssl.
 Campbell, Angus, LTGEN, Address to the Big Picture Lecture Series, accessed 02 July 2017, https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/speeches-and-transcripts/chief-of-army-address-to-the-big-picture-lecture-series.
 These factors are drawn from the yet-to-be-released DGTRADOC paper: ‘Evolving an Intellectual Edge’ A Professional Military Education Strategy for the Australian Army’ due for release in August 17.
 Langford, Ian , COL, Australia’s Offset and A2AD capability, 2017, accessed 01 August 2017, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Spring_2017/11_Langford_AustraliasOffsetAndA2AD.pdf.
 Ibid (accessed 01 August 2017).
 Grant T Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Smithsonian Books: Washington DC), 2004.