Within the three combat brigades there is a bias towards combat corps officers and SNCO’s when filling key appointments. This can be seen by looking at the selection of brigade commanders, who primarily come from a combat corps background, their regimental sergeant major (RSM), who again will primarily be from a combat corps, and the brigade major (BM), who, funnily enough, will also be from a combat corps.
While on the face of this discussion, having combat officers and SNCOs in key positions seems logical, it could also be hurting our ability to conduct combined arms in a multi-domain operating environment. It is stated in LWD 3-0-3 Formation Tactics that “At formation level, combat functions are performed through the synchronisation of BOSs (battlespace operating systems) to achieve the desired effects in accordance with the commander’s design.” This implies that, when operating at the formation level, it is more important to have someone in a key position such as the BM who has experience in the battlespace operating systems rather than in combat.
Combat officers, while having significantly more experience in combat at the tactical level, do not necessarily hold more experience at the formation level. When it comes to functioning within a higher headquarters, non-combat corps often have greater experience. This is particularly the case for officers and SNCOs within the Royal Australian Corps of Signals. From the very beginning of their careers, both officers and soldiers within the signals corps operate at the formation level. Further, signals officers and SNCOs are the only people within Army who are specifically trained to support and move a tactical formation level headquarters. In this regard, it could be argued that a signals corps major could be a good fit to be the BM within a combat brigade.
In accordance with LWD 3-0-3 Formation Tactics, “On operations, the appropriately enabled brigade is capable of conducting:
- joint land combat
- population protection (including non-combatant evacuation)
- information actions
- population support (including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief)
- indigenous capacity building.”
This indicates that direct combat is only 1/5 of the purpose of the combat brigade within an operational environment. If this holds true, it could be more prudent to have an officer in charge of brigade operations who is a subject matter expert in the other 4/5, supported by the brigade headquarter’s battle captains who are from combat corps. Furthermore, all majors, regardless of corps are required to conduct courses in which formation level tactics are taught and practiced. Although it can be argued that this does not bring technical expertise, it is recognised in LWD 3-0-3 that “Simple tactics are sound tactics. Fundamentally, formation tactics are uncomplicated and must be so to remain relevant in the complexity of the OE (operating environment)”. As such, it can be argued that the training undertaken in the progress to the rank of major is sufficient to achieve the end state of ‘simple tactics’.
So far, the main focus of this discussion has revolved around whether a combat corps officer is truly the suitable choice to be a BM within the combat brigade, however consideration must also be given for the RSM position. It is widely recognised that diversity in the workplace is a source of strength, and yet when a combat brigade commander is selected, rightfully from a combat corps, he or she is almost always paired with a combat corps RSM. So the question here is could the combat brigade be better served by having a diverse command team? Could a logistic corps RSM support a combat corps command?
Currently, combat brigade headquarters are being hampered by stove piped thinking due to bias towards combat corps officers and SNCOs. They lack the diversity of personality and experience that would be a combat multiplier in the modern battlespace where logistics can be the greatest deciding factor between success and failure and the ever present threat of information actions permeate everything. Army needs to reconsider whether the balance is right, and reconsider the bias towards combat soldiers at the formation level and higher.
About the author
Scott Cirakovic is a current serving officer within the Royal Australian Corps of Signals who has served in a broad range of roles, including communications support to divisional headquarters, brigade headquarters and battle groups. He has operational experience in Afghanistan supporting both Australian and multinational teams.