On Operations by BA Friedman is a book with a singular goal, to prove that the operational level of war is a myth. Friedman is motivated in this pursuit by the view that the ongoing existence of the operational level of war in western military thought is actively harmful to the pursuit of successful strategic outcomes.
Before building his case for why the operational level of war is a myth, Friedman first draws a clear distinction between the operational level of war and operational art. In Friedman’s view operational art is simply “the planning, preparation, synchronisation and sustainment of tactics over a sustained period of time, a large geographic expanse, or both.” Or put another way it is “the disciplines required to place military forces in an advantageous position to employ tactics to achieve strategic effect.” As Friedman himself observes, operational art is a supporting effort to both tactics and strategy.
Once the delineation between the operational level of war and operational art has been established Friedman then sets about proving his argument that the operational level is a harmful myth. To do this he takes the Napoleonic Wars to be the inflection point at which military conflicts begin to become recognisably modern in terms of the scope, scale and complexity involved. This in turn was enabled by the convergence of the industrial revolution and the socio-political consequences of the French Revolution. In Friedman’s view, the development of the professional military staff was the key innovation that enabled armies to cope with the scope, scale and complexity of industrial scale warfare and the application of operational art is how they do it.
Friedman then works forward in time tracing the evolution of operational thought as it was developed by various militaries (where operational thought includes both operational art and the operational level of war). He includes a chapter each on the French (under Napoleon), the German (including the Prussians), Soviet and American approaches to operational thought throughout this period. Each chapter abounds with historical examples dating back to the Peloponnesian War that explain the influences that shaped each nation’s approach to the development of operational thought.
Throughout each chapter Friedman very clearly articulates how each nation’s approach to operational thought impacted upon its ability to successfully prosecute tactical plans and what the effect on the pursuit of national strategy was.
Once the history of operational thought has been thoroughly traced out, Friedman then moves onto explaining how each function resident on a standard military staff supports the application of operational art and provides historic examples of when each one influenced the outcome of a battle. A chapter is dedicated to each staff function. The staff functions he covers are: administration; information (including intelligence); operations; fire support; logistics; and finally, command and control.
On Operations concludes with five historical case studies where each case study is a separate campaign and each one is a dedicated chapter in length. Within each of these chapters the historical context is given followed by a brief summary of how each of the staff functions were executed within that campaign by the respective combatants. The case studies are: The Austerlitz Campaign (1805); The Königgrätz Campaign (1866); The Atlantic Campaign (1914-1918); The Battle of Britain (1940); and, The Guadalcanal Campaign (1942).
Who should read this book?
On Operations presents a strong argument in support of its main hypothesis that the operational level of war is a myth. However its greatest utility is arguably to those who find themselves posted to a staff role, especially those who are posted to a tactical staff role such as a brigade or divisional headquarters. This is because On Operations does a great job of illustrating the critical function that the staff performs in allowing commanders to make sense of the complexity of modern military operations.
The logic of Friedman’s main argument is clear and concise (the entire book is only 202 pages long). In an age when the popular commentary surrounding military matters is to increasingly emphasise its increasing complexity, Friedman’s analysis cuts through the noise and in a way that simplifies the process through which tactics achieve strategy and strategy drives tactics.
About the Author: Chris is an Associate Editor at Grounded Curiosity and a currently serving Australian Army officer. Building on a multi-discipline engineering background, his passion is technological development and PME. Chris’ work has previously appeared on Grounded Curiosity, Strategy Bridge and The Cove. Find him on Twitter.