Australia’s region is in the ‘midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since World War II and trends, including military modernisation, technological disruption and the risk of state-on-state conflict, are further complicating our nation’s strategic circumstances’.[1] In response, Australia’s strategic policy framework, the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, signals ‘Australia’s ability – and willingness – to project military power and deter actions against [our nation]’.[2]
Under this policy framework, Australia’s ‘strategic objectives are to deploy military power to shape Australia’s strategic environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with credible military force’.[3]Fundamental to Australia’s credibility, capacity and capability to shape, deter and respond, is our application of the ten Australian Defence Force (ADF) principles of war:[4]
1. Selection and maintenance of the aim
2. Concentration of force
3. Cooperation
4. Economy of effort
5. Security
6. Offensive action
7. Surprise
8. Flexibility
9. Sustainment
10. Maintenance of morale
Supporting the intent of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the purpose of this review is to examine how four books – The Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command; The Culture of Military Organizations; America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History; and, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division – inform the application of the ADF’s ten principles of war.
First, this review defines the nature and character of war. Next, it defines the principles of war. Finally, this review applies ideas and lessons from the four books to deepen our understanding and enhance our employment of the ADF’s ten principles of war.
The four books articulate positive, negative and neutral applications of the ten principles of war. Combined, these books provide ideas on how we may think about war and then apply that thinking to shape, deter and respond in Australia’s immediate region: ‘ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific’.[5]
Ultimately, this review encourages readers to study and apply the ADF’s ten principles of war against other books. This continuous study and application clarifies our strategic thinking while enhancing our understanding, plans, preparation and, when necessary, execution of war. Short of war, this clarity may assist our application and execution of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update.
Defining the nature and character of war
“War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”[6]
– Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 89
The nature of war
Human nature is ‘immutable; otherwise, we would be something different than we know ourselves to be’.[7] War’s nature is ‘immutable, just as human nature is immutable’.[8] War is ‘both timeless and ever changing’.[9]
War’s nature is ‘violent, interactive, and fundamentally political’, defined as ‘a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other’.[10] The distinction of war as a ‘political act mandates that the means of violence must be justified by the desired policy ends’.[11] Without ‘justification through policy, and thus strategy, war carried out is senseless violence and blatant disregard for human life and national resources’.[12]
War is ‘nonlinear and intrinsically unpredictable’ consisting of ‘violence, enmity, passion; chance and friction; rationalised political objectives and dynamic interaction’.[13] The nature of war involving ‘terror, chaos, suffering, social and economic dislocation, destruction of life and property… has not changed, despite a variety of new actors, situations, technologies, drivers, and dynamics’.[14]
While the ‘magnitude of violence may vary with the object and means of war, the violent essence of war [does not] change’.[15] War remains driven by ‘fear, honour, interest, survival, uncertainty, bellicose culture, domestic pressure, perceived injustice, reaction to incursion, ambition or opportunism, and error as misunderstanding or prejudice’.[16] Continuities in war’s nature include ‘the techniques of war, the dynamic nature of conflict, the attempts to limit war, and the impact of ideas, leadership, and organisation’.[17]
The character of war
Although the nature of war is constant, the character of war changes, where ‘the means and methods we use [in war] evolve continuously’.[18] The character of war ‘varies just as the character of humans varies’.[19] War’s character ‘describes the changing way that war as a phenomenon manifests in the real world’.[20] As war is a ‘political act that takes place in and among societies, its specific character will be shaped by those politics and those societies’.[21] This means that the changing character of war:
…may be gradual in some cases and drastic in others. Drastic changes in war are the result of developments that dramatically upset the equilibrium of war such as the rifled bore, mass conscription, and the railroad.[22]
The character of war changes, in concert with changes in the ‘tools we use to make our social interactions’.[23] In the twenty-first century, these changes occur through global, national, regional and local interorganisational connectivity, dissonance and/or disruption of, for example: information; democracy or other political systems; social-media; energy; climate-change; cyber-effects; transportation; communication; big data; digital-systems; finance; commodities; capital; trade; education; training; remotely piloted & autonomous platforms; artificial intelligence; machine learning; additive manufacturing or 3D printing; microsatellites; human heuristics; psychometrics; and, quantum science.[24]
Importantly, ‘war and warfare are different words with a different meaning’.[25] While war ‘has an enduring, unchanging phenomenological “nature”; warfare, is the ‘way war is made’.[26] From ‘a holistic perspective, war is not only a state or condition that exists between two armed groups, but it has additional dimensions to include economic, political, diplomatic, and social-cultural contexts’.[27]
Warfare ‘encompasses the actual fighting’, making warfare simply one component – the fighting component – of war.[28] As a result of the distinction between war and warfare, we develop concepts to frame, and reframe, our understanding of the continuous evolution in the character, means and methods of war and its fighting component, warfare.
These concepts, which are not mutually exclusive, include great power competition, interstate war, conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, regular warfare, irregular warfare, manoeuvre warfare, attrition warfare, war and competition, multi-domain operations, gray zone warfare, political warfare, mosaic warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, unlimited warfare, limited warfare, fourth generation warfare, fifth generation warfare, sixth generation warfare, compound warfare, unrestricted warfare, non-linear war, next-generation warfare, information warfare, complex warfighting, adaptive campaigning, hyperwar, meme wars, and accelerated warfare. We also, somewhat confusingly, describe types of operations as ‘modes of warfare’ including ‘jungle war, naval war, guerrilla war, ground war, cyber war, amphibious warfare and surface warfare’.[29]
Ultimately, through conceptual thinking on the character of war, we recognise that ‘war is a social construct, an interaction between political communities’.[30] This conceptual thinking also:
…challenges the efficacy of strategic, operational and tactical aspects of warfare; demanding organisational changes, new initiatives in professional military education, fresh thinking on procurement and supply chains, and strategic leadership.[31]
Having defined the nature and character of war, this review now defines principles of war.
Defining principles of war
Commencing with Sun Tzu (500 BCE), principles of war have existed, in various forms, for approximately 2,500 years. Since then, ‘commanders and military thinkers, [including Count de Guibert, Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow, Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri de Jomini, Dennis Mahan at US Military Academy, and his son, Alfred Thayer Mahan, at US Naval War College], have set down their thoughts on the conduct of war… and the achievement of success’ combined with a ‘clear trend towards reducing principles to a short teachable list’.[32] Given our 25 centuries of thought on principles of war, and the ‘infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat’, it is clear that no principle is ‘timeless, universal, authoritative or binding’.[33]
Influenced by General J.F.C. Fuller, following World War I, the British adopted the first official list of principles of war, which included eight principles: maintenance of the objective, offensive action, surprise, concentration, economy of force, security, mobility, and co-operation.[34] Fuller viewed the principles as a ‘heuristic for how to bring about success in war’.[35] From Fuller’s work in the United Kingdom, principles of war are now included in the doctrine of Canada, China, France, Israel, Russia, and the United States. In Australia, we derive our principles of war from the United Kingdom.
We have stated that war’s nature is ‘violent, interactive, and fundamentally political’.[36] Therefore, principles of war are not simply ‘ten nouns’, or an ‘enumerated list of axioms’ or ‘isolated expressions’. Principles are ‘statements of cause and effect’ of war’s ‘complexity and unpredictability’.[37] There is ‘no formula for waging war or fighting battles’.[38] War is a duel, where commanders iteratively react. Victory is ‘often perception… [and] principles are means not ends’.[39]
Principles of war are not a script, irrefutable wisdom, formulaic thinking, ‘paint-by-numbers’ checklist or ‘an engineering solution…requiring conformity and groupthink’.[40] Principles of war, as a ‘diverse blending of thought’, are a ‘guide to action concerning the employment of combat power [and fighting power],[41] rather than an unquestioned truth with universal application to every single military operation’.[42] The application of principles of war ‘does not guarantee success’ and ‘circumstances will dictate the relative importance of each principle’.[43]
Each principle does not exist in isolation from the others. As this review demonstrates, skilled commanders combine principles of war into an operational system. Depending on the ‘infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat’, changes constantly occur in the precedence, relationships and employment of principles. In war, employment of one principle, may violate another.[44]
For example, surprise and offensive action may risk security. Concentration of force may limit economy of effort. Sustainment is tested, pressured and stressed through selection and maintenance of the aim, requiring flexible plans enabling multi-domain cooperation in human, physical and informational dimensions. Morale will vary according to people’s role, mission, tasks, training, equipment, physical environment, enemy action and assigned leadership.
Four books applied against the Australian Defence Force’s ten principles of war
- Selection and maintenance of the aim is the predominant principle of war. Depending on the situation or circumstance, the subsequent nine principles vary in relative importance. Military action is never an end in itself; it is always a means to an end. The military aim must be clear, simple, achievable, and morally justifiable.[45]
The Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, articulates an example of British selection and maintenance the aim, at operational and tactical levels, during the Battle of Cape St Vincent, 1797. This battle is described as the ‘high noon of British naval competence’. This competence was followed by a century where ‘Great Britain’s giant status [was based on] the principle of free trade and the policing of the world’s sea lanes’ and by a ‘naval supremacy which international consensus held to be beyond plausible challenge’.[46]
Andrew Gordon characterises the nineteenth century, where the British Navy lost its selection and maintenance of the aim, at operational and tactical levels, as serving in the long calm lee of Trafalgar.[47] The ‘most pernicious effect was the confusion of warfare with ritualised team games’.[48]
In these decades, ‘Britain’s officer classes were increasingly the inheritors, rather than the winners, of empire’ where leaders ‘behaved with the careless and humourless arrogance of supremacy’.[49] The British Navy’s ‘chivalry placed “character” far above “intellect”… [espousing, instead] the virtues of duty, honour, service, self-control, fellowship, courtesy, modesty and, above all, obeying the rules’.[50]
Twenty-five years later, in 1941, as defined by Captain William Outerson, the US Navy also demonstrated an inability to select and maintain an effective operational or tactical aim. In The Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Andrew Gordon concludes that Outerson’s description the US Navy’s lack readiness in 1941, applies equally to the British Navy in 1916:
With few shining exceptions, the performance of our senior naval commanders was dismal. Delay and procrastination in the presence of the enemy, faulty disposition of ships, unsound communication practices, disastrous tactical decisions, and utter confusion all contributed to losses of ships and personnel and to missed opportunities to inflict losses on the enemy.[51]
Other actions reduced the British Navy’s fitness for war. These included failure by Naval leaders to select or maintain coherent training, education or doctrine. This failure included a ‘lack of homogeneous squadrons of major warships’ combined with a ‘stream of piecemeal advances in metallurgy, ordnance and engineering, which [the Navy] neither welcomed nor knew how to synthesise into an operational doctrine’.[52]
In addition, as steam engines replaced sail, progress began disrupting the British Navy’s chivalric culture, where for example, Navy ‘wardrooms began to be infiltrated by [technically skilled] men with discordant accents and gauche manners from the industrial Midlands, Tyneside or Glasgow’.[53]
The Culture of Military Organizations, explains that a parallel ‘amateur ideal’ over ‘the need for and value of professional miltary education’ also permeated the nineteenth century British Army. The ‘amateur ideal’ was a ‘notion that manners – signifying virtue; and, classical culture –signifying a well-turned mind; were better credentials for leadership than any amount of expert practical training’.[54]
For example, ‘Prussia’s decisive military victories in 1866 and 1870-1871 revealing the mounting impact of technology on the battlefield…and associated increases in tactical complexity’, met with ‘bitter resistance’ from British Army leaders. In response to changing nineteenth century warfare, British leaders, ignoring any sense of a professional selection and maintenance of the aim, were ‘deeply hostile to book learning’, or ‘improved officer education’ or to considering whether ‘formal professional training was entirely necessary.’[55]
Providing recent examples of selection and maintenance of the aim, with varying elements of success, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, examines the President G.W Bush doctrine, introduced at the US Military Academy, West Point, 01 Jun 2002 as ‘preventative war’:
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. If we wait for threats to fully materialise, we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.[56]
In addition, in 2009, following eight years of war in Afghanistan and six years of war in Iraq, President Barack Obama’s selection and maintenance of the aim, defined ‘US military policy in three distinct categories’: depose, suppress and retard, as follows:
- Depose: Libya (2011), Syria (2011)
- Suppress: Pakistan (2010), Somalia (2010), Yemen (2012)
- Retard: Africa (2016)
In President Obama’s selection and maintenance of the aim, these three categories were designed to ‘minimise risks, keep down costs, and above all avoid anything approximating a quagmire’.[57]
2. Concentration of force achieving a decisive result, through combining ‘superior combat power at the point of main effort… [defeating] enemy’s intentions, tenacity and preparations’… [combined with] ‘deception, surprise, mobility and economy of effort elsewhere’.[58] Imposing restrictive conditions on an ‘enemy who is unable to respond, resulting in enemy reactions that are too late, poor coordinated, or in the wrong places’.[59]
The Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command describes friction preventing the 5th Battle Squadron (Battleships) commanded by Rear‑Admiral H. Evan‑Thomas concentrating forces prior to the Battle of Jutland based on:
- The growing strength of German Vice-Admiral Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group (Battle Cruisers) against British Vice-Admiral Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Fleet.
- The gunnery inefficiency of the Battle Cruiser Fleet.
- Pressure to redistribute the British Grand Fleet to prevent German coastal raids [on England].[60]
In contrast, leaders in Israel 1948-1949, such as the inaugural Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, nurtured and enabled concentration of force through unifying Israelis as ‘soldier-citizens and citizen-soldiers’.[61] At the establishment of Israel, the Israeli Army was defined as ‘a national school of sorts, a true melting pot in which the army would forge all members of society into a new Israeli mould’.[62]
The Culture of Military Organizations explains that to enable rapid and effective force concentration, Israeli leaders ‘discussed the desirable character of its soldiers and especially of its officers’. This ‘new, ideal officer [was] independent, self-confident, initiative-oriented, and always adapting to the reality of the battlefield with an open mind’.[63]
The existential requirement for these new, ideal officers arose because Israeli leaders ‘did not separate the goals of building a state from building an army’. Open-mindedness and initiative were therefore considered ‘essential personal traits because they were [key] in optimising the performance of the army [and concentrating that army’s force] as a whole’. In turn, Israel required a professional military education for these officers to ‘mobilise and deploy rapidly’ and then concentrate force as ‘daring, energetic, aggressive, active and flexibly [minded]’ leaders.[64]
At Israel’s establishment, Israel’s leaders knew their enemies, knew where to find them, knew their attacking trends and therefore aimed to build Israel’s forces accordingly. Optimising the Israeli Army’s concentration of force required ‘learning from foreign armies’ but ‘emulating none’. Favoured models included the Swiss Army ‘with a fighting cadre that relies heavily on reserves’. Studies were also made of pre-World War II armies from ‘Sweden, Norway, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia…all of which shared a reliance on reserves and cadres’.[65] Following these studies, the Israeli Army model to concentrate force became:
…even if we have reserve formations that can be mobilised and filled quickly…we must always hold assault forces [full-time regular forces] in full strength, ready and available for action.[66]
From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division examines the inability to concentrate force during the 36th Infantry Division’s failed attack across the Rapido River, 20-22 January 1944, caused through:
- Attacking, during a mobility inhibiting winter, the German’s ‘strongest fortified defence’ in the Gustav Line at the Liri Valley, which was ‘the only practicable route to Rome for tanks and supply vehicles’.[67]
- Crossing the ‘unfordable Rapido River’, integrated as a German obstacle into their ‘main line of resistance’.[68]
- Scarcity of ‘engineering supplies’, including no ‘unsinkable infantry footbridges’ available for 36th Infantry Division in Italy.[69]
- Lacking suitable cover for approaching troops, or troops readying pre-battle, ‘within a mile or more of the Rapido River’.[70]
- Minefields laid by the Germans ‘at all suitable approaches to the Rapido River’.[71]
- Advancing to cross the Rapido River by the 36th Infantry Division at night, in fog, through hastily cleared and inadequately marked minefields.
- Lacking flank security from neighbouring divisions, supporting the 36th Infantry Division’s crossing of the Rapido River.[72]
- Losing all rubber assault boats, in the attack, ‘because of the Rapido River’s swirling current, high vertical banks, and German artillery fire’. All rubber assault boats were ‘destroyed or carried downstream’.[73]
Finally, the Rapido River crossing, required 36th Infantry Division’s immediate concentration of force from a ‘few crossing points’ and ‘under fire’ on the western, German-held, side of the Rapido River.[74] This meant in the ‘midst of fire and confusion…disorganised troops were concentrating in fighting formations by infiltration on unfamiliar ground with no known landmarks to establish location and direction’.[75] Ultimately, troops formed ‘uncoordinated, independent and separated groups. Soon after daylight, ‘these groups were pinned down by overwhelming German fire’. They made no further progress.[76]
3. Cooperation optimises constructive relationships and interorganisational-connectivity between joint, combined, whole-of-government, interagency, allied and coalition partners. Synchronisation and orchestration are key to cooperation, where the exertion, resources and energies of the total force combine to achieve success. Effective cooperation enables principles of concentration of force and economy of effort.[77]
The Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command notes that Rear‑Admiral H. Evan‑Thomas, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron (Battleships), and Vice-Admiral Beatty, commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, did not cooperate prior to the Battle of Jutland:
…an hour’s conversation [between Evan-Thomas & Beatty] might have saved a thousand lives. Many notorious military blunders have been set up by poor personal relationships (if not wilful taciturnity) between key participants, the need for whose informed collaboration seems, in retrospect, to have been blindingly obvious.[78]
Cooperation between fleets was inhibited by the, 278 nautical mile or 500 kilometre, ‘apartness of the Battle Cruiser Fleet [at Rosyth, Edinburgh, Scotland] from the rest of the Grand Fleet’ [at Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands], which missed opportunities to cooperate through ‘informality, tactical experiments and the exposition of principles over procedures’.[79] Following the Battle of Jutland, the ‘two parts of the fleet… [were] united at a common base…the Firth of Forth’.[80]
Lack of cooperation between Vice-Admiral Beatty and Rear‑Admiral H. Evan‑Thomas manifested, at 4:44 p.m. 31 May 1916, when Beatty ordered the damaged, diminished and lightly armed Battle Cruiser Fleet to sail between Vice-Admiral Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group and Rear‑Admiral H. Evan‑Thomas’ heavily armed 5th Battle Squadron (Battleships).
This decision distracted Beatty and his staff from ‘concentrating on their command, control and communications functions’, slowed Beatty’s northern advance to outflank Vice-Admiral Hipper, and caused Evan‑Thomas’ subsequent ‘manoeuvring problem’ concerning the 5th Battle Squadron (Battleships) vulnerability to enemy fire when ‘approaching a turn’.[81]
America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, explains that effective cooperation requires a clearly defined purpose. For example, from 29 September 1982 to 07 February 1984, the US Marines in Lebanon were assigned an ill-defined purpose to ‘establish a presence in Beirut…to help establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese government to regain control of their capital’.[82] Presence, ‘especially by token forces occupying stationary positions, amounted to an incitement’.[83]
US policy hoped that ‘US forces by their very presence could bring order out of anarchy in Beirut’. Instead, the US Marines became ‘just one more faction in the internal Lebanese conflict’. Ultimately, without cooperation or purpose, the US Marines’ withdrawal from Lebanon was precipitated by ‘Islamic extremists, who inflicted the largest tactical defeat on the US military since the Korean War’, when on 23 October 1983 a truck containing explosives drove into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 US military personnel.[84]
The 03-17 September 1943, Operation Avalanche, amphibious landings at Salerno, described in From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, provide positive and negative examples of cooperation:
- Planning the amphibious landings, in Algeria, ‘with the planning sections of the Army, Navy and VI Corps staffs…[achieved] mutual understanding…the job was done in four days under pleasant and harmonious circumstances’.[85]
- Establishing ‘cordial relations’ between Major General Fred L. Walker, Commanding General 36th Infantry Division, and Rear Admiral John L. Hall, Commander Amphibious Force, North African Waters (8th Fleet). Rear Admiral Hall was ‘always helpful and cooperative and complies with any request…or gives convincing reasons why he cannot’.[86]
- Requiring 36th Infantry Division to land at Salerno and ’secure and hold, in defence, a perimeter of 25 miles (40 kilometres)…[while also] removing required combat vehicles [from 36th Infantry Division] to make room aboard ships for cameramen and newspapermen with their vehicles’.[87] These and other changes required 36th Infantry Division: ‘rearranging, relisting, regrouping, replanning’.[88]
- Learning from Operation Husky amphibious landings of Sicily, July-August, 1943, from Lieutenant General Omar Bradley who commanded II Corps during that campaign.
Finally, cooperation in preparation for Operation Avalanche was enhanced through the 36th Infantry Division rehearsing with the Navy in Algeria, August 1943. These rehearsals, enabled both elements to experience, identify and rectify cooperation issues with Army-Navy ‘signals communications [and] troop landing times and locations’.[89]
4. Economy of effort is the prudent allocation and application of resources to achieve desired results. Economy of effort balances competing requirements, where economising employment of resources in one place, enables alternate force concentration options.[90]
As described in The Culture of Military Organizations, US Marine Corps ‘culture is created at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot’, based on an economy of effort syllabus little changed since World War II. Through the ‘prudent allocation and application of resources to achieve desired results’, for twelve weeks Marine recruits are ‘shorn of their hair, privacy and any control over their lives’.[91] At Recruit Depots, the Marine Corps finds out ‘if young women and men want to be Marines’. With the ‘exception of rifle marksmanship qualification, little that happens [at the Recruit Depot] mirrors combat’. Of the ‘2,168 dedicated hours of recruit training, only 528 hours are reserved for formal instruction’.[92]
Before the US Marine Corps invests significant technical, logistical and instructional resources into the occupational specialities of their future Marines, Recruit Depots enable an economy of effort to test recruits on their ‘physical ability, social interdependence, emotional stability and strength of character to survive three months of stress, physical exhaustion and anxiety’. Annual recruit camp failure is ‘between 10 and 15 per cent’. Importantly, to maximise a symbiotic economy of effort and minimise wasted resources, Marine Recruiters ‘receive no credit for making their [recruiting] quota unless their recruits complete [their twelve weeks of recruit training]’.[93]
America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, provides an example of misapplication of the economy of effort principle. Where the 1990-91 Gulf War ‘ranks as a moderately large conflict waged for quite limited objectives’. These objectives include: ejecting the Iraqi Army from Kuwait, but not destroying the Iraqi Republican Guard; restoring Kuwait’s sovereignty; and, ‘the vague hope that a demonstration of superior American power might somehow lay the foundations for what President George H. W. Bush was calling a “new world order”.[94]
Through military power, not economy of effort, demonstrated in the 1990-91 Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush had no illusions about ‘advancing the cause of freedom, democracy and human rights’. Instead, President George H. W. Bushsought ‘stability’, for the Islamic world, combined with ‘the birth of a new American century [and] the onset of a unipolar world, with America at the centre’.[95]
In contrast, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History describes US economy of effort support in Afghanistan, under Operation Cyclone, 1979-1988, implementing US President Ronald Reagan’s policy against the Soviet Union: ‘we win and they lose’.[96] Arranging economy of effort activities for Operation Cyclone included the US:
- Leading with Central Intelligence Agency planning, personnel and support.[97]
- Gaining support from ‘Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, United Kingdom and Israel’.[98]
- Enabling mujahedin as ‘in effect, America’s surrogate soldiers’.[99]
Importantly, President Reagan’s economy of effort in Afghanistan was enabled, via Pakistan as an intermediary, through the US supplying, ‘money [between $4 billion and $5 billion, matched ‘dollar-for-dollar by Saudi Arabia], weapons [including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles], ammunition and training support’.[100]
5. Security enabling the force to ‘seize objectives instead of countering enemy manoeuvre’ through protection of ‘timings, information, influence tasks and communications traffic’ combined with ‘physical security, including firm bases, flank protection, deception, movement, reconnaissance and fire support limits’.[101] Security includes protection from surprise, observation, espionage, sabotage and subversion. While security may limit the economy of effort principle, it complements principles of offensive action and surprise.[102]
Russia, ‘despite its vast spaces, has confronted a series of significant invasions’ including: Mongols, 13th century; Poles, 17th century; Swedes, 18th century; Napoleon, 19th century; and Germans in both World Wars, 20th century. Consequently, The Culture of Military Organizations explains that security is a key element of Russian strategic culture, ‘driven by fear and suspicion of the outsider and an expansionist mentality aiming to incorporate buffer states that lay along its borders, along with a deep suspicion of its neighbours’.[103]
Russian concerns for security also led Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, to create Russian Army doctrine for deep battle and operational art. This doctrine, including Field Regulations (1929), Instructions on Deep Battle (1935) and Provisional Field Regulations (1936), was predicated on ‘a breakthrough by armoured forces followed by exploitation forces in a series of “successive operations” denying the enemy time to regroup’, with aviation responsible for ‘disrupting enemy reserve forces’.[104]
Tukhachevsky’s June 1937 trial and execution during Stalinist purges, on charges of conspiracy with Germany, ‘inhibited further discussion and the development of deep battle and operational art’ at ‘precisely the moment when the Red Army was testing the theory and was entering it into the realm of practice’. Deep battle would only re-enter ‘into Red Army practice after the disastrous defeats of 1941’, including Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s ‘decreet revival of principles of “deep battle” at Stalingrad, 1942-1943.[105]
Enhancing Russian security, the Soviets ‘resurrected theories of operational art’ in 1943-1944, which ‘created a pattern of successful offensives, reduced casualties and contributed to victory in World War II’. These years included massing two tank armies to exploit breakthroughs at Belgorod-Kharkov, August 1943. This success was followed by Soviet ‘improvements in echeloning tactical, operational and strategic forces’ and coordinating ‘sequential and successive attacks’ forcing the Germans to ‘shuttle their inadequate reserves and reinforcements from one catastrophe to another’.[106]
Enhancing American security, US President Richard Nixon announced the Nixon Doctrine in Guam, 25 July 1969. This doctrine required the US to ‘deputise dependable allies to shoulder responsibility for maintaining regional security, thereby easing the burden on the United States’.[107] US support to Iran exemplified the Nixon Doctrine in the Greater Middle East. By 1978, ‘skyrocketing [US] arms sales’ increased the number of Americans living in Iran to 1,122 military personnel and ‘forty thousand American civilians working in Iran as employees of US-based defence contractors’.[108]
On 01 February 1979, the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, ended the Nixon Doctrine in Iran.[109] On 04 November 1979, Iranian students seized the US embassy in Tehran, detaining 66 Americans. Then on 24 December 1979, 30,000 United Soviet Socialist Republic troops invaded Afghanistan. In response, US President Jimmy Carter announced the Carter Doctrine on 23 January 1980:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.[110]
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, 1977-1981, wrote that ‘the Carter Doctrine was modelled on the Truman Doctrine’.[111] On 12 March 1947, the Truman Doctrine stated:
We shall not realise our objectives [in the United Nations], unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.[112]
Andrew Bacevich asserts that the Truman Doctrine’s policy for containment of communism, was ‘coded language signifying that the United States would henceforth oppose any prospective increase in communist influence anywhere’. The expansive security language in both the Carter Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine, ‘represented broad, open ended commitments…that expanded further with time’.[113]
Yet in contrast to the Truman Doctrine, ‘successful implementation of the Carter Doctrine’ required ‘more than mere containment’. Securing oil supplies from the Middle East ‘required that the United States impose order on the Persian Gulf and its environs’.[114]
Therefore, in the view of Andrew Bacevich, the ‘Carter Doctrine inaugurated America’s War for the Greater Middle East. Security predicated on the Carter Doctrine has meant, ‘from the end of World War II to 1980, virtually no American soldiers were killed in action while serving in [the Greater Middle East]…since 1980, virtually no American soldiers have been killed in action anywhere except the Greater Middle East’.[115]
6. Offensive action exploits opportunities to gain and retain the initiative. Offensive action is swift, decisive and directed toward the achievement of the end state.[116]
The Union Army of the Potomac, whose leaders included General George B. McClellan, 1861-1862, is described in The Culture of Military Organizations as ‘institutionally sluggish, passive and incapable of the aggressive decisiveness needed for success in offensive military operations’.[117] In contrast, ‘while McClellan refused to move his forces [in 1861]’, General Ulysses S. Grant and the Union Army of the Tennessee ‘went on the offensive’ on the Mississippi River at Belmont, Missouri, 07 November 1861.[118]
Belmont was ‘hardly an unmitigated success’ in some ways, ‘it was near disaster’. Nevertheless, the battle established important precedents for Grant’s approach to unifying his team for offensive action. These included Grant ‘pushing his troops to take the initiative and remain on the offensive’ and creating, where Union gunboats were crucial for sustainment and flexibility, ‘excellent relations with naval officers’.[119]
Grant ‘instilled in his army a culture of aggressive movement and determination to succeed that was all too often absent in other armies’ combined with ‘unbounded confidence in [his troops’] abilities, despite the odds’.[120] Grant also ‘set an example of collegiality and cohesiveness for his senior subordinates, helping to lead an army with a relativity harmonious leadership cadre’.[121]
After Belmont, Grant ‘continued his aggressive style of campaigning’ with victories at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February 1862. Importantly, the ‘Confederate military position in the west never recovered’ from Grant’s victories which ‘allowed the Union Army to use the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers as secure invasion routes into the Confederate heartland’.[122]
The Culture of Military Organizations notes that British Naval operations in World War II, prove ‘doctrinal, educational and training improvements’ can directly enable combat effectiveness in offensive action.[123] For example, British Navy World War II operations reflected interwar efforts to learn lessons on offensive action mishandled in World War I, including ‘skill in night actions, the offensive use of destroyers, divided formations, carrier-based torpedo attacks, and subordinates taking the initiative’.[124]
In World War II, the British Navy also enhanced offensive naval support to land operations. For example, during the allied withdrawal from Crete in May-June 1941, Admiral Andrew Cunningham declared ‘we must not let them [the Army] down, at whatever the cost to ourselves’. Cunningham observed:
…it takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition [of repairing broken trust between the British Navy and Army].[125]
Cunningham understood that employing the British Navy offensively to assist the British Army maintained the ethos that ‘the Navy has never failed the Army’ and that abandoning the Army in Crete meant that ‘the Navy would never survive such an action’.[126]
7. Surprise seizing the initiative in ‘unexpected strength, from an unexpected direction, at an unexpected time… [combined with] tempo and deception’.[127] Surprise is positively correlated with other principles of war, including offensive action, security and morale.[128]
As noted in the offensive action principle, General Ulysses S. Grant’s ‘aggressive style of campaigning’, was effective in his western victories. However, aggression and relentless offensive action are also vulnerable to surprise, as demonstrated when Grant ‘did not pay as much attention as he should, to possible Confederate responses’. This included the enemy’s ‘concentration via rail across the Confederate states’ at Shiloh, 06-07 April 1862.[129]
On day one at Shiloh, Grant’s ‘generalship was questioned’ because he had ‘allowed an immense army to march upon him and surprise him’.[130] Many Union Army ‘soldiers felt that Grant mishandled’ the battle’s opening stanza.
However, on day two, under Grant’s leadership Union soldiers ‘emerged from the battle confident in their own fighting abilities’ because they had ‘seen the Union Army’s survival and subsequent counterattack’. They had ‘moved into the heart of the Confederacy, fought a great battle when the Confederates mustered a powerful [and unexpected] counterstroke, and held their ground with expectations of further advances south’.[131]
From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division describes the ‘complete surprise’ Major General Fred L. Walker’s 36th Infantry Division gained in breaking the enemy siege of the allied amphibious landings at Anzio, through ‘shattering’ Field Marshal Kesselring’s ‘last line of defence south of Rome’.[132]
Advancing from the beach-head at Anzio, through Mount Artemisio and Velletri, 30 May – 01 June 1944, 36th Infantry Division enabled ‘compete surprise’ on German defensive positions through:
- Shouldering, personally by Walker, the entire responsibility for the success or failure of the attack.[133]
- Building a temporary road over Mount Artemisio for artillery and tanks to exploit weaknesses in ‘lightly held’ German defences.[134] Movement of artillery, tanks, tank destroyers and supply vehicles over Mount Artemisio, enabled 36th Infantry Division to rapidly ‘close German escape routes leading northward from Velletri’, ensure the 36th Infantry Division was ‘strong enough to check German counterattacks’, and protect friendly ‘lines of communication’ over Mount Artemisio.[135]
- Attacking with two 36th Infantry Division regiments, at night, against the German defensive line at a weak point; a gap in the German defences.[136] This gap, ‘approximately two miles (3.2 km) wide’, was ‘between the left flank of the German 1st Parachute Corps (Luftwaffe ground troops) and the right flank of the 76th Panzer Corps’.[137]
The only organisation available to occupy the two mile gap in the German defences was an ‘engineer platoon, at Castel d’Ariano on Mount Artemisio’.[138] Late in the day, German General Wilhelm Schmalz counter-attacked the 36th Infantry Division with a panzergrenadier battalion which failed against Major General Walker’s combined arms force.[139]
8. Flexibility is the capacity to create and adapt plans taking account of unforeseen circumstances ensuring success in the face of friction, unexpected resistance, or setbacks, while capitalising on fleeting or unanticipated opportunities. Flexibility enables commanders to maintain force balance and effectiveness, through time and space, in a range of tasks, situations and conditions.[140]
The Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Chapter 9, The Long Calm Lee of Trafalgar, is a reminder that organisations seeking flexibility must first relentlessly pursue personal, professional, team and organisational mastery. Where mastery is the:
- Ability to perform given tasks, skills and actions.
- Awareness of why tasks, skills and actions are performed.
- Flexibility to perform tasks, skills and actions in a range of environments and circumstances.
- Self-confidence to apply tasks, skills and actions in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous conditions.[141]
For the Royal Navy’s pursuit of mastery enabling flexibility at the Battle of Jutland, 1916, Andrew Gordon argues that:
…habits of tactical initiative had turned through an immense 200-year cycle. From the low of around 1700 they had risen, amid countless knocks and bruises, to the famous battle-wise high of the early 1800s; and then, in the century of maritime peace after the Napoleonic Wars, they had slipped insidiously down back to the original hidebound point of departure.
The 1900s found the British Fleet’s outlook firmly regressed to the age when the sacred Signals and Instructions [book] held sway. And while the British public of 1914 took for granted that another Trafalgar was imminent – indeed was their birthright – the professional conditioning of the officers in command of the Royal Navy’s mighty dreadnought squadrons made it more likely that a clash with the [German] High Seas Fleet would be a repeat of (say) Velez Malaga in 1704 [tactical draw between Anglo-Dutch navy and French navy] rather than of [a decisive victory at] Trafalgar in 1805.[142]
Gordon concludes emphasising to us serving today, that personal, professional, team and organisational flexibility and mastery requires more than:
…bouts of table-thumping at Trafalgar Night Dinners – [where we may] imagine that the great practitioners of the past prevailed because they were ten feet tall, rather than because of the study they devoted to the strategy and tactics both of contemporary and of earlier battles and campaigns. The edge which the Trafalgar heritage gave the British at Jutland [1916], Dunkirk [1940], Matapan [1941], the Falklands [1914 & 1982], is immeasurable, and any other navy would sell its soul for such as legacy.
But if it carries with it the conceit of imputing, by association of heredity, extra stature to today’s wearers of the dark blue, and thus relieves them of the bother of addressing their professional provenance (bother which technocrats will have them believe is a waste of time), it is as poor a preparation for combat today as it was in 1914.[143]
As noted in The Culture of Military Organizations, German reports on British fighting formations in the World War II Italian campaign, contrast inflexible British tactics with flexible German tactics:
British attacking formations were split up into large numbers of assault squads commanded by officers. Non-commissioned officers (NCO) were rarely in the “big picture”, so that if officers became a casualty, the NCOs were unable to act in accordance with the main plan. The result was that in a quickly changing situation, the junior commanders showed insufficient flexibility. For instance, when an objective was reached, the enemy would fail to exploit and dig in for the defence.[144]
The German conclusion was: ‘as far as possible, go for the enemy [British] officers. Then seize the initiative yourself’.[145]
9. Sustainment includes improvisation, foreseeing opportunities, calculating risks and overcoming friction to enable logistic and personnel support necessary for the effective action of a force. Efficacious sustainment, enables selection and maintenance of an aim, while supporting troop morale.[146]
The Culture of Military Organizations, identifies the success of the United States in World War II originating from ‘strategic culture that understood the importance of logistics, economic realities, and the difficulties involved in the projection of power over immense distances’.[147] The genesis of this strategic culture was the Union Armies in the American Civil War ‘mobilising vast miltary power’ while ‘fighting a war over vast continental distances’. The result was an ‘emphasis on logistics…at the centre of US military culture’ where projecting power over continents and oceans meant ‘an understanding of logistics deeply embedded in [the US] military approach to stategy as well as operations’.[148]
In contrast, Germany’s 1941 invasion of Russia, Operation Barbarossa, was ‘above all a failure of logistics’ with their ‘major offensives [in Russia], always exceeding their logistical capabilities’.[149] Despite these failures, German cultural proclivity to diminish the importance of sustainment, even after World War II, was summarised by General Franz Halder, German Army Chief of Staff, 1938-1942, when he stated: ‘quartermaster (logisticians) must never hamper operational concepts’.[150] This statement ‘flew in the face of every major campaign in World War II, with the exception perhaps of the 1940 German campaign in France’.[151]
The 600,000 strong Indian Expeditionary Force “D”, served in Mesopotamia (now Iraq), from November 1914 until November 1918 to ‘protect British interests in the region’. The force ‘occupied Basra… [and then] advanced 370km up the Tigris River to Kut-al Amara’. Despite ‘serious questions regarding logistical support and reinforcement policies’ plans were ‘formed and supported by London for a continued advance [an additional 200km] toward Baghdad’.[152]
The Culture of Military Organizations explains that by November 1915, the Indian Expeditionary Force “D”, without ‘properly trained British officers’, was 50km from Baghdad. Force “D” was ‘stretched to the logistics breaking point and short of reinforcements’ while ‘confronting veteran Turkish troops from the Gallipoli campaign’. As a result, Force “D”was defeated at Ctesiphon, on 22-24 November 1915, and then besieged at Kut-al Amara. This element of Force “D”surrendered to Turkish forces in late-April 1916.[153]
Following defeat of the Force “D” at Kut-al Amara, Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude ‘took command in July 1916’ and ‘set out to reform the army’. Maude ‘created a stronger logistical and sustainment system’, he ensured that ‘replacements arrived to fill the ranks’ and improved the ‘quality of British officers’ in Force “D”. In addition, ‘better equipment and more artillery arrived’ in Force “D” to ameliorate the ‘lack of fire support that had plagued earlier phases of the campaign’.[154]
Under Maude’s leadership as an ‘administrator, reformer… [and] sound commander in the field’, the Indian Expeditionary Force “D”, recaptured Kut-al Amara in February 1917 and captured Baghdad in March 1917. In November 1917, Maude died of cholera, but the now well sustained and well-led Force “D” ‘moved on to defeat the Ottomans’.[155]
10. Maintenance of morale is an essential element of combat power[156] and fighting power[157], engendering courage, energy, cohesion, endurance, steadfastness, determination and a bold, offensive spirit. Military success, enabled through leadership, training, discipline, sustainment and confidence, often depends as much on morale as on material advantages.[158]
Effective culture creates organisational cohesion enabling morale, through forging organisational identity and articulating expected group behaviours.[159] In The Culture of Military Organizations, Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray define culture as the ‘assumptions, ideas, norms, and beliefs, expressed or reflected in symbols, rituals, myths and practices, that shape how an organisation functions and adapts to external stimuli and that give meaning to its members’.[160]
For example, American service members are ‘imbued with the cultural ethic to leave no soldier behind on the battlefield, which undoubtedly enhances morale and willingness to fight rather than flee, knowing that one’s comrades will be at one’s side if the worst occurs’.[161] Culture may also ‘lock an organisation into dated, inappropriate…or brutal’ ways of warfare.[162] Nevertheless, ‘organisational culture is more likely to determine action than [an organisation’s] explicit policy or ideology’.[163]
Major General Fred L. Walker, a regular army officer who commanded 36th Infantry Division, Texas National Guard, comprising between 16,000 and 26,000 soldiers, 13 September1941 to 07 July 1944, emphasises maintenance of morale throughout From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, based on:
- Treating people with respect and dignity.
- Setting high standards and requiring competence.
- Caring for soldier wellbeing.
- Prioritising rest, reinforcements and preparation prior to battle.[164]
- Making changes ‘only if necessary and when changes would be an improvement’.[165]
- Caring, preserving and accounting for government property.[166]
- Nurturing disciplined initiative ‘when an order does not fit the situation at hand, the person responsible must do what they believe the commander would do if they were present’.[167]
Major General Walker transformed ‘civilians into disciplined soldiers, provided for their welfare, developed their esprit de corps, guided their training for teamwork in battle’. Finally, Major General Walker led and influenced how the tactics of battle affected his solders.[168]
Conclusion
Under the 2020 Defence Strategic Update policy framework, Australia’s ‘strategic objectives are to deploy military power to shape Australia’s strategic environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with credible military force’.[169] Fundamental to Australia’s credibility, capacity and capability to shape, deter and respond, is our application of the ten Australian Defence Force (ADF) principles of war:[170]
1. Selection and maintenance of the aim
2. Concentration of force
3. Cooperation
4. Economy of effort
5. Security
6. Offensive action
7. Surprise
8. Flexibility
9. Sustainment
10. Maintenance of morale
Supporting the intent of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, this review examined how four books – The Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command; The Culture of Military Organizations; America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History; and, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division – inform the application of the ADF’s ten principles of war.
First, this review defined the nature and character of war. Next, it defined principles of war. Finally, this review applied ideas and lessons from the four books to deepen our understanding and enhance our employment of the ADF’s ten principles of war.
The four books articulate positive, negative and neutral applications of the ten principles of war. Combined, these books provide ideas on how we may think about war and then apply that thinking to shape, deter and respond in Australia’s immediate region.[171]
Ultimately, this review encourages readers to study and apply the ADF’s ten principles of war against other books. This continuous study and application clarifies our strategic thinking while enhancing our understanding, plans, preparation and, when necessary, execution of war.
About the Author: Major General Chris Field, Australian Army, @ChrisFieldAUS, serves as Deputy Commanding General, Operations, US Army Central / Third US Army.
Cover Image Credit: POIS Justin Brown, Defence Image Gallery
This review does not represent any official positions of the US Army or US Department of Defense or the Australian Army or Australian Department of Defence.
[1] Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Canberra, 2020, p. 3
[2] 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Ibid, p. 3
[3] 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Ibid, pp. 3-4
[4] Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics, 2016, Canberra, Australia, 14 November 2016, p. 15
[5] 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Op Cit, p. 6
[6] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ind. ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 89.
[7] Col Jim Van Riper, USMC (Ret), Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare: Let’s get the terminology correct, Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, May 2021, p. 68
[8] Col Jim Van Riper, USMC (Ret), , Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare: Let’s get the terminology correct, Ibid, p. 66
[9] Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Headquarters United Sates Marine Corps. Washington, DC, 20 June 1997, p. 17
[10] Christopher Mewett, Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside its Changing Character, War On The Rocks, Washington, District of Columbia, United States, 21 January 2014,
https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/ [accessed 27 July 2021] and
United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Op Cit, p. 3 and Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Capstone Series, Defence Publishing Service, edition 3, Canberra, Australia, 2012, p. 2-1
[11] Marinus Era Novum, Continuing the Dialogue Strategy and maneuver warfare, Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, May 2021, p. 70
[12] Marinus Era Novum, Continuing the Dialogue Strategy and maneuver warfare, Ibid, p. 70
[13] United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Op Cit, pp. 8, 13 and Changing Character of War Centre, Research Priorities: The Changing Character Of War: What Is War Today? How Does It Change? University of Oxford, Pembroke College, Oxford, UK, 2021, Research — The Changing Character of War Centre (ox.ac.uk) [accessed 27 July 2021].
[14] Changing Character of War Centre, Research Priorities: The Changing Character Of War: What Is War Today? How Does It Change? Ibid, Research — The Changing Character of War Centre (ox.ac.uk) [accessed 27 July 2021]. For analysis of the nature of war, that at its ‘essence, has not changed, despite a variety of new actors, situations, technologies, drivers, and dynamics’, see: Antlion J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 61–83; Williamson Murray, America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 2017, pp. 34-35; Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, Continuity and Change, The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War, Military Review, March/April 2015, pp. 5-13; Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, p. 2-5
United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Op Cit, p. 14
[16] Changing Character of War Centre, Research Priorities: The Changing Character Of War: What Is War Today? How Does It Change? Op Cit, Research — The Changing Character of War Centre (ox.ac.uk) [accessed 27 July 2021].
[17] Changing Character of War Centre, Research Priorities: The Changing Character Of War: What Is War Today? How Does It Change? Ibid, Research — The Changing Character of War Centre (ox.ac.uk) [accessed 27 July 2021].
[18] United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Op Cit, p. 17
[19] Col Jim Van Riper, USMC (Ret), Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare: Let’s get the terminology correct, Op Cit, p. 66
[20] Christopher Mewett, Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside its Changing Character, Op Cit, ,https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/ [accessed 27 July 2021]
[21] Christopher Mewett, Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside its Changing Character, Ibid,
https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/ [accessed 27 July 2021]
[22] United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Op Cit, p. 17
[23] Zachery Tyson Brown, Unmasking War’s Changing Character, Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 12 March 2019 Unmasking War’s Changing Character – Modern War Institute (usma.edu) [accessed 27 July 2021]
[24] Zachery Tyson Brown, Unmasking War’s Changing Character, Ibid, Unmasking War’s Changing Character – Modern War Institute (usma.edu)[accessed 27 July 2021]
[25] Christopher Mewett, Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside its Changing Character, Op Cit,
https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/ [accessed 27 July 2021]
[26] Christopher Mewett, Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside its Changing Character, Ibid,
https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/ [accessed 27 July 2021]
[27] Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Security International, 2007, Part 2: Strategy, Maxim #21, p. 88
[28] Col Jim Van Riper, USMC (Ret), Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare: Let’s get the terminology correct, Op Cit, p. 65
[29] Col Jim Van Riper, USMC (Ret), Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare: Let’s get the terminology correct, Ibid, p. 65
[30] Zachery Tyson Brown, Unmasking War’s Changing Character, Op Cit, Unmasking War’s Changing Character – Modern War Institute (usma.edu) [accessed 27 July 2021]
[31] Changing Character of War Centre, Research Priorities: The Changing Character Of War: What Is War Today? How Does It Change? Op Cit, Research — The Changing Character of War Centre (ox.ac.uk) [accessed 27 July 2021].
[32] Major Craig Stone, The Canadian Army’s Principles of War in the Future: are they relevant? The Army Doctrine And Training Bulletin, Canada’s Professional Journal On Army Issues, Kingston, Ontario, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 20 https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-9-3-1E.pdf [accessed 27 July 2021] and Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age, Novato, California, Presidio Press, 1998, p. 267.
[33] Marinus, Maneuver Warfare and the Principles of Wars: Maneuverist Paper No. 8, Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, May 2021, pp. 101, 104 and United States Army, Infantry in Battle, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, Army University Press 1939, p. 170
[34] John Alger, The Quest For Victory, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 122
[35] J.F.C. Fuller, Gold Medal (Military) Prize Essay for 1919, Royal United Services Institution Journal65, no. 458, May 1920, p. 244.
[36] Christopher Mewett, Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside its Changing Character, Op Cit,
https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/ [accessed 27 July 2021]
[37] Marinus, Maneuver Warfare and the Principles of Wars: Maneuverist Paper No. 8, Op Cit, pp. 104-106 and Dudley W. Knox, The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare, Annapolis, Maryland, U.S. Naval Institute Press, April–March 1915, citing Staff Study, U.S. Naval War College, 1954, Annex N-6: E.C. Kalbfus, Memorandum Notes on NWC History.
[38] Marinus, Maneuver Warfare and the Principles of Wars: Maneuverist Paper No. 8, Op Cit, p. 105 and Donald E. Bittner, Curriculum Evolution: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1920–1988, Washington, DC, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1988, p. 11
[39] Geoffrey Wawro, Do the Classic Principles of Warfare Still Apply? Security Studies Program Seminar, Center for the Study of Military History, University of North Texas, 20 April 2005
http://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed_archives05spring/wawro.htm [accessed 27 July 2021]
[40] Geoffrey Wawro, Do the Classic Principles of Warfare Still Apply? Ibid.
http://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed_archives05spring/wawro.htm [accessed 27 July 2021] and Marinus Era Novum, Continuing the Dialogue Strategy and maneuver warfare, Op Cit, p. 70
[41] Martin van Creveld, in Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, asserts that ‘within the limits set by its size, an army’s worth as a military instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by its fighting power’. He defines fighting power as:
…resting on mental, intellectual, and organisational foundations… manifesting, in one combination or another, as discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die. …Fighting Power, in brief, is defined as the sum total of mental qualities that make armies fight.
Implied by van Creveld are the inexorable connections between fighting power and leadership.
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, Praeger; Reprint edition, 2007, pp. 3 & 170
[42] Russell W. Glenn, No More Principles of War, Parameters, Spring 1998, p. 56 and Marinus, Maneuver Warfare and the Principles of Wars: Maneuverist Paper No. 8, Op Cit, p. 106
[43] Minister of National Defence, Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine, Ottawa, Ontario Canada, 2009, p. 2-6
[44] Marinus, Maneuver Warfare and the Principles of Wars: Maneuverist Paper No. 8, Op Cit, p. 106
[45] Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-1
[46] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1999, pp. 156-163
[47] Battle of Trafalgar: 21 October 1805, naval engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, which established British naval supremacy for more than 100 years; it was fought west of Cape Trafalgar, Spain, between Cádiz and the Strait of Gibraltar. A fleet of 33 ships (18 French and 15 Spanish) under Admiral Pierre de Villeneuve fought a British fleet of 27 ships under Admiral Horatio Nelson. During the battle Villeneuve was captured, and his fleet lost 19 or 20 ships—which were surrendered to the British—and 14,000 men, of whom half were prisoners of war. Nelson was mortally wounded by a sniper, but when he died at 4:30 PM he was certain of his complete victory. About 1,500 British seamen were killed or wounded, but no British ships were lost. Trafalgar shattered forever Napoleon’s plans to invade England.
Encyclopaedia Britannica’s editors, Battle of Trafalgar, European history, 2020 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 14 October 2020 <https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Trafalgar-European-history> [accessed 27 July 2021]
[48] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Op Cit, p. 181
[49] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Ibid, p. 164
[50] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Ibid, p. 180
[51] William Outerson, Peacetime Admirals-Wartime Admirals, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, 107:4, April 1981, pp. 32-37
[52] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Op Cit, p. 166
[53] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Ibid, p. 166
[54] Richard Hart Sinnreich, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Influence of Culture on the Victorian British Army, Chapter 7, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 171
[55] Richard Hart Sinnreich, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Influence of Culture on the Victorian British Army, Chapter 7, Ibid, p. 171 and Williamson Murray, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Culture on the British Army, 1914-1945, Chapter 8, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 186
[56] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Random House, New York, 2017, pp. 55-56 and President Bush, Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, Office of the Press Secretary, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 01 June 2002
Greater Middle East: including not only the Arab world but also Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. The precise geographical area for the Arab world is a matter of dispute. Commonly the Arab world is defined as: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen. Sometimes Djibouti, Somalia and the Comoros Islands are also defined as Arab countries.
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html [accessed 27 July 2021]
[57] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Op Cit, pp. 326-327
[58] Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics, Op Cit, p. 74; Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine,Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, pp. 6A-1 – 6A-2, and, Norman M. Wade, About the Elements of Combat Power, The Lightning Press, Washington, DC, 2021 https://www.thelightningpress.com/about-the-elements-of-combat-power/ [accessed 27 July 2021] Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command relations, movement and manoeuvre, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The US Army collectively describes the last six elements of combat power – command relations, movement and manoeuvre, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection – as the warfighting functions.
[59] Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics, Op Cit, p. 75
[60] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Op Cit, p. 43
[61] Gil-li Vardi, The Culture of Military Organizations – An Army Like No Other The origins of the Israeli Defense Forces military culture, Chapter 11, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 259
[62] Gil-li Vardi, The Culture of Military Organizations – An Army Like No Other The origins of the Israeli Defense Forces military culture, Chapter 11, Ibid, p. 259
[63] Gil-li Vardi, The Culture of Military Organizations – An Army Like No Other The origins of the Israeli Defense Forces military culture, Chapter 11, Ibid, p. 259
[64] Gil-li Vardi, The Culture of Military Organizations – An Army Like No Other The origins of the Israeli Defense Forces military culture, Chapter 11, Ibid, p. 259
[65] Gil-li Vardi, The Culture of Military Organizations – An Army Like No Other The origins of the Israeli Defense Forces military culture, Chapter 11, Ibid, p. 260
[66] Gil-li Vardi, The Culture of Military Organizations – An Army Like No Other The origins of the Israeli Defense Forces military culture, Chapter 11, Ibid, p. 261
[67] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Savas Beatie, California, 2020, pp. 268, 294
[68] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, pp. 268, 277
[69] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 268
[70] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 270
[71] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 270
[72] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 277
[73] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 278
[74] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 272
[75] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, pp. 274-275
[76] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 278
[77] Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-2
[78] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Op Cit, p. 56
[79] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Ibid, p. 57
[80] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Ibid, p. 507
[81] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Ibid, pp. 129-131
[82] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Op Cit, p. 67
[83] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, p. 76
[84] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, pp. 62, 67, 68, 73
[85] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Op Cit, p. 197
[86] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 200
[87] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 201
[88] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 202
[89] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 205
[90] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-4
[91] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Ibid, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-4 and Allan R. Millett, The Culture of Military Organizations – The US Marine Corps, 1973-2017 – Cultural preservation in every clime and place Chapter 16, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 391
[92] Allan R. Millett, The Culture of Military Organizations – The US Marine Corps, 1973-2017 – Cultural preservation in every clime and place Chapter 16, Ibid, pp. 391-392
[93] Allan R. Millett, The Culture of Military Organizations – The US Marine Corps, 1973-2017 – Cultural preservation in every clime and place Chapter 16, Ibid, pp. 391-392
[94] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Op Cit, p. 119
[95] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, pp. 119 & 128
[96] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, pp. 51-52
[97] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, pp. 50-61
[98] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, p. 52
[99] Quoting George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War¸ New York, 2003, p. ix in Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, p. 55
[100] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, pp. 53-54
[101] Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics, Op Cit, p. 75
[102] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-3
[103] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 9-10
[104] Reina Pennington, The Culture of Military Organizations – Military Culture, Military Efficiency and the Red Army 1917-1945, Chapter 10, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 242-243
[105] Reina Pennington, The Culture of Military Organizations – Military Culture, Military Efficiency and the Red Army 1917-1945, Chapter 10, Ibid, pp. 243-244
[106] Reina Pennington, The Culture of Military Organizations – Military Culture, Military Efficiency and the Red Army 1917-1945, Chapter 10, Ibid, pp. 244-245
[107] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Op Cit, p. 13
[108] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, p. 14
[109] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, p. 16
[110] Address by President Carter on the State of the Union Before a Joint Session of Congress, Washington, January 23, 1980, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d138 [accessed 27 July 2021]
[111] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Op Cit, p. 29
[112] President Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, in Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, New Haven, Connecticut, 2008 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp [accessed 27 July 2021]
[113] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Op Cit pp. 28-29
[114] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, p. 29
[115] Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, Ibid, p. 11
Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., March 2004. p. 1 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief29.pdf [accessed 27 July 2021]
[116] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-2
[117] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 61
[118] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Ibid, p. 61
[119] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Ibid, 2019, pp. 61-62
[120] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Conclusion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 450-451
[121] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Op Cit, p. 63
[122] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Ibid, p. 67
[123] Corbin Williamson, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Royal Navy, 1900-1945, Learning from disappointment, Chapter 14, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 350
[124] Corbin Williamson, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Royal Navy, 1900-1945, Learning from disappointment, Chapter 14, Ibid, p. 346
[125] Corbin Williamson, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Royal Navy, 1900-1945, Learning from disappointment, Chapter 14, Ibid, p. 348
[126] Corbin Williamson, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Royal Navy, 1900-1945, Learning from disappointment, Chapter 14, Ibid, p. 348
[127] Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics, Op Cit, p. 74
[128] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, pp. 6A-3 – 6A-4
[129] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Op Cit, pp. 67-68
[130] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Ibid, 2019, p. 68
[131] Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, The Culture of Military Organizations – Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee, Chapter 3, Ibid, 2019, pp. 67-68
[132] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Op Cit, pp. viii – ix & 395
[133] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, pp. viii – ix & 341
[134] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 338
[135] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 388
[136] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 344
[137] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 389
[138] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 389
[139] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 393
[140] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-4
[141] Lieutenant Colonel Greg de Somer and Major David John Schmidtchen, Professional Mastery: The Human Dimension of Warfighting Capability for the Army-After-Next, Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No. 107, Canberra, p. 3
[142] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Op Cit, p. 398
[143] Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command, Ibid, p. 600
[144] Williamson Murray, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Culture on the British Army, 1914-1945, Chapter 8, Op Cit, 2019, p. 203 quoting Shelford Bidwell & Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945, London, 1982, p. 228
[145] Williamson Murray, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Culture on the British Army, 1914-1945, Chapter 8, Ibid, 2019, p. 203 quoting Shelford Bidwell & Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945, London, 1982, p. 228
[146] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-5
[147] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, OP Cit, 2019, p. 7
[148] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, Ibid, p. 9
[149] Reina Pennington, The Culture of Military Organizations – Military Culture, Military Efficiency and the Red Army 1917-1945, Chapter 10, Op Cit, 2019, p. 245
[150] Dennis Showalter, Instruments of War: The German Army 1914-1918, Osprey Publishing, London, 2016, p. 188
[151] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, Op Cit, 2019, p. 7
[152] Daniel Marston, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900-1947: an evolving identity, Chapter 6, Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 143
[153] Daniel Marston, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900-1947: an evolving identity, Chapter 6, Ibid, pp. 143-144
[154] Daniel Marston, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900-1947: an evolving identity, Chapter 6, Ibid, p. 144
[155] Daniel Marston, The Culture of Military Organizations – The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900-1947: an evolving identity, Chapter 6, Ibid, pp. 144-145
[156] Norman M. Wade, About the Elements of Combat Power, The Lightning Press, Washington, DC, 2021https://www.thelightningpress.com/about-the-elements-of-combat-power/ [accessed 27 July 2021].
[157] Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, Op Cit, pp. 3 & 170
[158] Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Op Cit, Annex A, Chapter 6, p. 6A-5
[159] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, Op Cit, 2019, p. 2
[160] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, Ibid, 2019, pp. 8-9
[161] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, Ibid, 2019, p. 1
[162] Peter R. Mansoor (Editor), Williamson Murray (Editor), The Culture of Military Organizations – Introduction, Ibid, 2019, p. 1
[163] Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial Germany, Ithaca, New York, 2006, p. 92
[164] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, pp. viii, xxiii
[165] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 5
[166] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 26
[167] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Ibid, p. 91
[168] Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division, Op Cit, p. xiii
[169] 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Op Cit, pp. 3-4
[170] Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics, Op Cit, p. 15
[171] 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Op Cit, p. 6